Economic turmoil is roiling Pakistan, spawning another daunting test for the country’s wobbly leadership.

A key ally of the U.S. in its global fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban, Pakistan is trying to contain an insurgency by Muslim militants that is spreading from border areas with neighboring Afghanistan. The government also is struggling to hold together a shaky coalition of warring political parties.

Now, an onslaught of economic woes threatens to overshadow both these challenges. Pakistan raised prices of fuel products Sunday for the sixth time in five months, by as much as 17%. Runaway food prices, energy shortages and a plunging stock market have hit Pakistanis hard and left the government scrambling to defuse public anger, say officials and analysts.

“The economic issue is rapidly surpassing all other issues,” says Shahnaz Wazir Ali, a special assistant to Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani who has helped draft emergency relief measures for the country’s poor.

Pakistan’s consumer-price index was nearly 22% higher in June than a year earlier. Chronic power outages, which have come during Pakistan’s sizzling summer months, have disrupted businesses and helped sour the political mood. Before a modest gain Friday, the main Karachi Stock Exchange index had fallen for 15 straight sessions, triggering a window-smashing rampage at the exchange Thursday by anguished investors.

On Saturday, in his first televised national address since becoming prime minister in March, Mr. Gilani tried to shift much of the economic blame to President Pervez Musharraf, whose military-backed administration ran Pakistan for eight years before the country returned to civilian rule earlier this year.

Mr. Gilani said his government was paying the price for underinvestment in the agriculture and power sectors during Mr. Musharraf’s rule. Other problems, such as high inflation stemming from rising global oil and food prices, were beyond Pakistan’s control, he added.

The prime minister urged the business community to curb capital flight and instead invest domestically. And he asked the public to reduce its consumption of fuel and cooking oil to reduce imports. Mr. Gilani also promised quick relief for the poor through cash handouts and other new government aid programs.

The current distress marks a substantial shift from the euphoria that followed Pakistan’s February elections. After former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in December, her Pakistan People’s Party went on to win the most seats in Parliament, defeating supporters of Mr. Musharraf, a former army general and chief military commander.

The PPP formed a coalition government with the other big electoral victor, the Pakistan Muslim League. That party is led by Nawaz Sharif, also a former prime minister and longtime rival to Ms. Bhutto. But the two key partners quickly fell out over the issue of when and how to reinstate judges Mr. Musharraf sacked last year while they deliberated whether he was eligible to run for another term in office.

In protest over the PPP’s reluctance to act, Mr. Sharif’s party withdrew from top posts in the coalition government until the judges are reseated. On Saturday, Mr. Gilani, who is a PPP leader, promised that there would be “good news” soon on the judges’ issue, but didn’t elaborate.

The political bickering has fueled public frustration. In a public-opinion poll released last week, 86% of respondents thought Pakistan was headed in the wrong direction, compared with 59% in June 2007, when Mr. Musharraf was in charge. The survey, conducted by the International Republic Institute, a Washington nonprofit organization, also found that 72% said their economic situation had worsened by June of this year. In a similar poll covering the same period last year, the figure was 34%.

The economic downturn has come just as swiftly. The economy expanded at a 5.8% annual clip for the fiscal year that ended June 30, after growing close to 7% annually during the previous five years. Imports of expensive oil have cut Pakistan’s foreign-exchange reserves by more than 35% since last October, widened the country’s trade deficit and put pressure on its currency, the rupee, which has touched record lows against the dollar in recent weeks.

Salman Shah, a former finance minister and economic adviser to Mr. Musharraf, says the new government missed opportunities to reassure investors by failing to push ahead with privatization of big state companies or to market bond issues overseas. He also decries the government’s push to slow consumer spending, arguing that purchases of mobile phones, televisions and other items had spurred growth in recent years.

“It’s like giving your Mercedes to the cook, and he crashes it,” Mr. Shah said of the new leadership.

Reuters

Pakistan raised fuel prices Sunday as it copes with inflation, energy shortages and a plunging stock market.

Some of Pakistan’s poor are also calling for more assertive leadership. Mohbullah, a 45-year-old truck driver who goes by a single name, returned to Peshawar this past week after two months on the road, exhausted and having earned just 300 rupees ($4.24) from his trip. Food and bribes at police checkpoints absorbed much of his income, he says.

“The government should come here and listen to our complaints,” he says. “Why are we suffering?”

Officials insist help is on the way. Under one relief program, the government has pledged to set aside 50 billion rupees to be extended in monthly payments to the poor. Called the “Benazir Income Support Program,” it is the biggest cash handout in Pakistan’s history, according to Ms. Ali, the assistant to the prime minister, who helped design it.

The aid initiative has another goal. It could help diminish the allure of joining up with Islamist militants, who commonly offer financial incentives to the families of volunteer suicide bombers, Ms. Ali says. “People who are living better, who can plan for their children’s future, are less likely to veer toward extremism,” she contends.

Dealing with the insurgency is a central aspect of Islamabad’s relations its biggest aid donor: the U.S. Militants have organized under a group called Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and have spread their influence beyond the country’s lawless tribal regions to North West Frontier province.

In recent days, Pakistani security forces have pounded strongholds in the northwest with helicopter gunships, seeking to drive insurgents out of towns around the provincial capital of Peshawar.

The U.S. has committed more than $10 billion to Pakistan since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Last week, Sens. Joe Biden (D., Del.) and Richard Lugar (R., Ind.) introduced a bill that would triple the current level of nonmilitary aid to $1.5 billion annually over five years. The money is to be set aside for schools, roads and medical clinics, but the bill would also demand Islamabad provide greater accountability of spending on its counterterrorism efforts.

Mr. Gilani, in his address Saturday, said he was committed to fighting terrorists and ending religious extremism in Pakistan.

But American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops in Afghanistan complain that Islamist insurgents there are crossing Pakistan’s border to find sanctuary in tribal areas. A clash with Taliban insurgents last month led to a U.S. air strike on the Afghan-Pakistan border that accidentally killed Pakistani soldiers and inflamed tensions between Islamabad and Washington.

In his speech, Mr. Gilani reiterated that foreign forces wouldn’t be allowed to operate inside Pakistan. “No foreign power will be allowed to take action on Pakistan soil,” he said. “Any decision or action within its boundary will be taken by the country itself.”

Write to Peter Wonacott at peter.wonacott@wsj.com

By Yasser Latif Hamdani

Our part of the world, in the first half of the twentieth century, was defined by two great colossi: Jinnah and Gandhi, and their personality clash. Jinnah’s creation i.e. Pakistan today exists on the map as a testament to that titanic clash though it is in no shape or form that its founder would recognize it in. It so happened that one of the actors in this clash was a Muslim by birth and the other a devout Hindu which gave it a communal color- but in reality it was a much more fundamental clash than some religious or sectarian dispute as many people seem to think, using that awful device i.e. Occam’s Razor which has no application to the complexity of the study of history.

The point of dispute between Jinnah and Gandhi was not religion but modernity. Both Jinnah and Gandhi had spent their formative phases in England where both of them were called to the bar. But while Jinnah imbibed European modernity and perfected it, Gandhi revolted against it. In Jinnah’s world religion played little or no role and was largely a personal matter. Gandhi on the other hand came to see religion as the central point and the meaning of life. When Jinnah was increasingly getting molded in British liberalism, western individualism and the capitalist success ethic, Gandhi came to see virtue in poverty. When they finally came face to face as members of the Congress Party, Gandhi had transformed from the barrister he once was to the Hindu “Mahatma” though it took another few years for him to convince the masses of this. At the very first public meeting he pointed out that Jinnah – despite his dress and education- was from the “minority community”. This distinction between Indians on the basis of religion was something Jinnah had fought against with the conservatives of the Muslim League but to hear from Gandhi’s mouth must have come as quite a surprise. After all Jinnah at this time was at the top of his game- a highly paid barrister in addition to being a liberal and secular Indian nationalist agitating against the British to leave India.

Initially Gandhi stayed away from this nationalist sentiment opting instead to recruit for the British Army but when he did, he made religion and spirituality the central focus of the anti-British movement. Not only did he appeal to Hindu religion and culture but Gandhi cut across communal lines to make alliances with Muslim divines, thereby bringing Islam into politics. After this, Jinnah did not look back- taking Gandhi’s classification of him as a minority and ran with it, ultimately defeating his famous rival before both of them passed away in 1948. He wrested from Gandhi and the Congress a Muslim homeland against opposition not just from the Hindu majority but a majority of the religious divines of Muslims and the combined British sentiment against him. Yet today Pakistan – torn by ethnic conflict, religious extremism and military rule- is hardly something to proud of, especially not for the lawyer parliamentarian that Jinnah was – believing in rule of law and sovereignty of all people regardless of religion caste or creed. Pakistanis as a nation are the anti-thesis of the kind of man their founder was: He was disciplined and orderly, undisciplined Pakistanis today are in utter chaos. He was a man of action – Pakistanis are defined by their inaction. He believed in success through hard work – Pakistanis are always on the look for the eternal short cut. He believed in civilian supremacy in state affairs- Pakistanis have allowed themselves to be ruled by the military for more than half their existence as a nation. Jinnah was a modern minded man who believed in women’s rights and minorities rights- Pakistanis today are defined by their religious bigotry and misogyny. But above all Jinnah was considered incorruptible and un-purchase-able- Pakistanis have had the honor of being the second most corrupt country in the world for years. It is about time Pakistanis reverted to the great man that founded their country.

Meanwhile the India that Jinnah left behind in 1947 despite its many drawbacks and shortcomings seems to be going from strength to strength emerging as the world’s largest secular democracy. It is also an emerging economic power house which has the attention of the world. Yet is Modern India’s success Gandhi’s triumph and Jinnah’s defeat? No! Gandhi rejected materialism and romanticized poverty. He was willing to sink to the lowest level with others but not ready to pull his people out of dark desperate poverty which most of his people belonged to. The new India would have none of it. It is the India of billionaires – 40 and counting. It is the India of new world class companies founded and run by Indians ready to colonize the world, as they once were colonized themselves. It is the India of commerce and industry, of information technology and of Indian Premier League. This new India does not believe in looking for virtue in poverty but is today engaged in real poverty alleviation and this has meant quality lives not just for millions but hundreds of millions of people.

This is also the India which Jinnah’s daughter calls home, where his Parsi grandson Nusli Wadia thrives as a leading businessman without ever being pointed out as being “from the minority community” and Nusli’s wife Maureen Wadia runs the Miss India Pageant, where his grandson Ness Wadia and his wife-to-be Preity Zinta own and operate IPL teams. If Jinnah was to return to the subcontinent, it is anybody’s guess which country he would want to live in. Karen Armstrong once wrote that Jinnah wanted to make Pakistan so that Muslims would not be limited by their religious identity – increasingly India seems to be moving towards a destination where religion is taking a backseat. It is no longer the India defined by caste or creed or a romance with poverty. They say those who laugh last laugh the best. Whether Indians admit or not, in success they have emulated the man who has been demonized in their history books. Make no mistake about it: this new India is Jinnah’s India. More importantly however for South Asia and the world at large, it is an India that Pakistanis can learn from if they still wish to revive Jinnah’s Pakistan.

-Shuja Nawaz , (Oxford University Press,Pakistan , 2008700 pages; 13 black and white photographs, 6 maps; ISBN13: 978-0-19-547660-6ISBN10: 0-19-547660-3)

By Adil Najam

A recent cover story in the prestigious journal Science reports that the scientific view of the Indus Civilization, of how it compares to its other two contemporary civilizations (Mesopotamia and Egypt), and of what might have happened to it is undergoing a stark and important reconsideration. That scientists consider it to be “Boring No More” and, indeed, the emerging new understanding of the Indus Civilization suggests that it might have been “a powerhouse of commerce and technology in the 3rd millennium B.C.E.”

I must confess that I am late in reporting about, and nearly missed, the June 6 cover story by Andrew Lawler, titled “Unmasking the Indus” (Science, Vol. 320, p. 1276-1285). I have been traveling out of the country, nearly non-stop, for the last seven weeks and only just got to the stack of Nature and Science (two of my favorite magazines) that had piled up in the unread mail. Of course, one look at the cover – which depicts a “bearded, horned terra cotta mask, about 5 centimeters in height, found at Mohenjo Daro, Pakistan” – had me hooked on what is unusually detailed (10-page long, with 6 sub-reports) and gripping report on the exciting new knowledge and understanding of the Indus Civilization that is beginning to emerge; knowledge that is beginning to question our long-held assumptions about what the civilization was, or was not.

Of course, there is much written about the Indus Civilization, including fascinating and detailed reports in National Geographic, etc., but this Science report is different because it highlights how our scientific – in this case archaeological – knowledge on the subject is not only expanding, but changing. It really is worth reading in the full and I would encourage readers to do so.

The opening few paragraphs of the lead essay – “Boring No More, a Trade-Savvy Indus Emerges” – give a flavor of the key argument:

THAR DESERT, PAKISTAN–Egypt has pyramids, temples, and mummies galore. Ancient Mesopotamians left behind the dramatic saga of Gilgamesh, receipts detailing their most prosaic economic transactions, and the occasional spectacular tomb. But the third of the world’s three first civilizations had, well, good plumbing. Even the archaeologists who first discovered the Indus civilization in the 1920s found the orderly streetscapes of houses built with uniform brick to be numbingly regimented. As recently as 2002, one scholar felt compelled to insist in a book that the remains left behind by the Indus people “are not boring.”

Striking new evidence from a host of excavations on both sides of the tense border that separates India and Pakistan has now definitively overturned that second-class status. No longer is the Indus the plain cousin of Egypt and Mesopotamia during the 3rd millennium B.C.E. Archaeologists now realize that the Indus dwarfed its grand neighbors in land area and population, surpassed them in many areas of engineering and technology, and was an aggressive player during humanity’s first flirtation with globalization 5000 years ago. The old notion that the Indus people were an insular, homogeneous, and egalitarian bunch is being replaced by a view of a diverse and dynamic society that stretched from the Arabian Sea to the foothills of the Himalaya and was eager to do business with peoples from Afghanistan to Iraq. And the Indus people worried enough about the privileges of their elite to build thick walls to protect them. “This idea that the Indus was dull and monolithic–that’s all nonsense,” says Louis Flam, an archaeologist at the City University of New York who has worked in Pakistan. “There was a tremendous amount of variety.”

… Even well-combed sites are still full of surprises: The city of Harappa may be 1000 years older and Mohenjo Daro far larger than once thought. And the dramatic “Buddhist stupa” adorning Mohenjo Daro’s high mound may in fact date back to the Indus heyday around 2000 B.C.E.

However, the problems remain serious. As the author points out:

…piecing together a cohesive new picture is hampered by the political discord between India and Pakistan. Many foreign archaeologists steer clear of Pakistan because of political instability, while India’s government–scarred by colonialism–often discourages researchers from collaborating with European or American teams. A virtual Cold War between the two countries leaves scientists and sites on one side nearly inaccessible to the other.

One key in this new wave is the knowledge that was unleashed with the discovery, in the 1970s by a French-led team, of Mehrgarh “dating to 7000 B.C.E. in the Baluchistan hills on the western fringe of the Indus valley.” The Science article points out:

[Mehrgarh] is now widely accepted as a precursor to the Indus and clear proof of the indigenous nature of the later civilization. That idea gets new support from surveys here in the Thar Desert, on the eastern edge of the Indus valley. This area was long assumed to have been largely uninhabited before the rise of the Indus cities. But hundreds of small sites now show that humans lived here on the plains, not just in the Baluchistan hills, for several millennia prior to the rise of the Indus, says archaeologist Qasid Mallah of Shah Abdul Latif University in Khairpur.

Of course many mysteries remain – the largest probably about language and civilizational collapse – however, there is a key, and exciting difference:

For the first half-century after its discovery, the Indus was virtually synonymous with Mohenjo Daro and Harappa. No other major cities were known. But along with 1000 smaller sites, archaeologists now count at least five major urban areas and a handful of others of substantial size. These sites reveal new facets of Indus life, including signs of hierarchy and regional differences that suggest a society that was anything but dull and regimented.

One of the most fascinating aspect is about international trade:

While evidence accumulates from Indus cities, other insights are coming from beyond the region, as artifacts from Central Asia, Iraq, and Afghanistan show the long arm of Indus trade networks. Small and transportable Indus goods such as beads and pottery found their way across the Iranian plateau or by sea to Oman and Mesopotamia, and Indus seals show up in Central Asia as well as southern Iraq. An Indus trading center at Shortugai in northern Afghanistan funneled lapis to the homeland. And there is strong evidence for trade and cultural links between the Indus and cities in today’s Iran as well as Mesopotamia.

…”These people were aggressive traders, there is no doubt about it,” adds [Gregory] Possehl [ of the University of Pennsylvania], who has found Indus-style pottery made from Gujarat clay at a dig in Oman. Archaeologist Nilofer Shaikh, vice chancellor of Latif University, takes that assertion a step further, arguing that “the Indus people were controlling the trade. They controlled the quarries, the trade routes, and they knew where the markets were.”

She points out that although Indus artifacts spread far and wide, only a small number of Mesopotamian artifacts have been found at Indus sites. Evidence suggests that some Indus merchants and diplomats lived abroad, although the trade was certainly two-way. An inscription from the late 3rd millennium B.C.E. refers to one Shu-ilishu, an interpreter from Meluhha [a reference to the Indus civilization], reports NYU’s Wright in a forthcoming book. What may be Shu-ilishu and his wife are featured on a seal wearing Mesopotamian dress. There is some evidence for a village of Indus merchants between 2114 and 2004 B.C.E. in southern Iraq. And “a man from Meluhha” knocked out someone’s tooth during an altercation and was made to pay a fine, according to a cuneiform text, hinting at a life that was neither faceless nor boring.

There is much more in the full report to keep the reader engrossed. How archeaologists are chronically short of resources. How archaeologist Farzand Masih from Punjab University, Lahore, who is excavating at Ganweriwala, Pakistan, and Vasant Shinde from Deccan College, Pune, who is excavating at Farmana, India, work a mere 200 kilometers apart but cannot collaborate on their findings. How part of the last remains of a 5000-year-old city known as Lakhanjo Daro has been lost to “development” and a factory is being built over the site. How the politics of religion threatens to undermine scientific integrity and matters of archeology are being played out in the Indian parliament as well as the courts. How looters and thieves are running away with treasures of the Indus civilization. And much more.

I do hope our readers will find the Science report as fascinating as I did.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Canada’s defence minister, Peter MacKay, both made unrealizable statements on the weekend — Karzai in threatening to retaliate against incursions into his country from Pakistan, MacKay by suggesting there is a possibility of a diplomatic solution to the dispute.

The Afghan National Army is a creation of the United States and other countries whose presence in Afghanistan keeps Karzai in office. The threat of Afghan army units carrying out retaliatory attacks on Pakistan without support is just that, a threat incapable of being effectively acted on. MacKay’s “diplomatic solution” is even more improbable. Although Afghan army units could cross into Pakistan, should Karzai be foolish enough to send them, Canada has no way of negotiating an end to the incursions.

Pakistan’s tribal territories have never been effectively under government control. The Pashtuns don’t recognize the Durand line, drawn by foreigners in 1893, as dividing them into 25 million Afghans and 15 million Pakistanis.

Canada would be better served if MacKay sought to convince the Americans that their continuing violation of Pakistan by air attacks is counterproductive. As Eric Margolis has written, “Widening the Afghan War into Pakistan is military stupidity on a grand scale, and political madness.”

Joe Hueglin

The events in Punjab Medical College in Faisalabad recently have brought to the forefront once again a very important and yet neglected issue which continues to blacken our collective conscience as a nation. The expulsion of 23 students for allegedly preaching their faith underscored the sickness that has crept into the majority in this country bringing bad name to the country and the faith of Islam as well. There is need for serious inquiry as to whether this pathetic state of affairs will be allowed to continue and will the Ahmadis continue to be the victims of Pakistan’s version of Jim Crow Laws aided and abetted by a PC0-ed judiciary passing numerous “Dredd Scott” like decisions.

The persecution of Ahmadis even under the present mangled constitution is patently unconstitutional. A fair court of law would have noticed and pounced on the Ahmadi-specific legislation that has crept into our statute books for every single one of these laws violate a couple dozen fundamental rights accorded to the citizens of Pakistan not the least Article 20 which gives every citizen the right to practice and propagate his or her religion without any caveats. The rot however began with Bhutto’s 2nd Amendment which declared Ahmadis Non-Muslim. His law minister, Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, proved himself to be a poor constitutional lawyer when he declared that the National Assembly was sovereign and could take such a step. The correct legal position was that of Sir Zafrullah Khan, erstwhile Pakistani foreign minister and one of the authors of the Lahore Resolution, who argued that it was beyond the scope of the National Assembly to determine the faith of an individual especially under the Constitution of 1973. Even the Islamic provisions of the constitution of 1973 were to be interpreted according to each sect’s understanding and Ahmadis being an established Muslim sect in 1973 were entitled to their own interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah.

Ahmadis were also very much Muslim when the Government of Pakistan laid claim to Qadian as a Muslim holy place in 1947 as a counterweight to Sikh claims to their holy sites in Pakistan. No less a person than Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father, had declared unequivocally on the Ahmadi issue that anyone who calls himself a Muslim is a Muslim and that anyone who says otherwise is conspiring against the Muslim cause. It is little known that Jinnah was finally persuaded to return to India and lead the Muslim League by Mr. Ibrahim Dard, the Imam of the London Ahmaddiya Mosque in the 1930s. The future founder of Pakistan had gone to and prayed behind the Ahmaddiya mosque unaware that the country he was about to create in two decades would one day make such an act punishable under law. If he was to time travel into the future, he would probably abandon the whole Pakistan project altogether.

Every single act of persecution against Ahmadis is quite unjustifiably laid at the door of the idea of Pakistan. Unjustifiably because those at the fore front of the “Persecute Ahmadis movement” are the same people who bitterly opposed Pakistan and considered Jinnah as big a Kafir as they consider the Ahmadis. The first occurrence of the anti-Ahmaddiya feeling on record is a report by a Muslim League activist who found that in the tribal areas, Fakir of Ipi and other pro-Congress Mullah elements had begun to describe the Muslim League as a bastion of “Qadiyanism”. The same feeling has persisted. Majlis-e-Ahrar that led the anti-Ahmaddiya movement in 1953-1954 was the biggest Congress ally before partition. Jamaat-e-Islami chief Maududi had dismissed Jinnah and others as too secular and westernized to properly lead the Muslims. The biggest persecutors of Ahmadis i.e. Darul-Uloom-Deoband and their cronies owe their very political existence to Mahatma Gandhi who introduced these Mullahs in the Khilafat movement- out of which arose the Jamiat-e-Ulema-Hind- the forerunner of all fundamentalist and militant movements in South Asia and beyond.

The idea that a majority can dictate to a minority what it is or isn’t allowed to call itself is the very anti-thesis of the principle Pakistan was created on. Pakistan was created on the idea that a permanent majority cannot by sheer numeric strength dominate and dictate to a permanent minority. The anti-Ahmaddiya legislation flies in face of the whole Pakistan idea, leading to at least one perceptive commentator calling the second amendment to the constitution in 1974 nothing less than the death of Pakistan. That a PPP government was in charge and Pakistan’s brightest Prime Minister was in power makes that event even more ironic. Bhutto perhaps had no other option. Had he resisted it, the establishment would have used the issue to dismiss Bhutto the same way they dismissed Khawaja Nazimuddin and the Muslim League government in 1953. Of course Bhutto fell three years later and atleast the rotund and very religious Nazimuddin does not carry the blot of being the Prime Minister who persecuted a group of people based on their faith. Great responsibility lies on the shoulders of the Pakistan People’s Party to undo its heinous mistake and clear up the good name of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once and for all. It has an excellent opportunity to undo a historic wrong.

Remember the issue is not, and it has never been, whether anyone agrees with Ahmadis or considers them Muslim. It is one’s right to hold an opinion but that opinion cannot be imposed no matter what force of majority is behind it. The issue is- as it has always been- what Ahmadis consider themselves. No construction of Article 20 of the constitution can deny them the right to call themselves Muslims and by settled law fundamental rights are the over-riding feature of any written constitution. Therefore the second amendment itself is unconstitutional and illegal, not to mention the antithesis of Pakistan and its idealism. It is also an issue that cuts deep into our aspiration to be a civilized and tolerant society based on rule of law. The actions of those who had always opposed Pakistan and its founder are beginning to taint the very ideal to utter joy of our enemies home and abroad. It is time for Pakistanis to stand up and be counted.

The writer is a lawyer and a participant in the lawyer’s movement. He has asked to keep his identity secret for the fear of persecution

Found this remarkable articulation of Ahmadi case by lawyer working at the UN.

A Commentary by Karen Parker, J.D.
for International Educational Development
Humanitarian Law Project
A Non-governmental organization at the United Nations

December 1993

International Educational Development, Inc.
8124 West Third Street
Los Angeles, California 90048
tel. (213) 653-6583
fax. (213) 653-

International Educational Development, Inc. (IED) is a nonsectarian, non-governmental organization granted consultative status at the United Nations by Dag Hammarskjold. Originally founded by Jesuit fathers to assist hospitals and schools in developing countries, in 1989 IED merged with the Los Angeles based Humanitarian Law Project and broadened its scope to advocate and promote world-wide compliance with human rights and humanitarian law.

Karen Parker, a director of IED, as an attorney at law specializing-in human rights and humanitarian law. She is IED chief representative to the United Nations, Geneva and New York.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . .2

ORDINANCE XX VIOLATES FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW . . . . . . . . . . . .3

THE AHMADI CASE . . . . . . . . . . .8

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PAKISTAN . . . . . . . . . 11

——————————————————————————–
INTRODUCTION
On July 3, 1993 the Supreme Court of Pakistan decided Mujib-ur-Rehman Dard v. Pakistan (the Ahmadi case). (1) In dismissing eight appeals (2) brought by members of the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam (Ahmadi Muslims), (3) the Court refused to find ordinance XX of 1984, which severely penalizes Ahmadi Muslims for holding their religious beliefs and practicing their religion, (4) in violation of either Pakistan’s Constitution or international human rights law. The five criminal defendants of this case were returned to jail for of the remainder of their sentences imposed for wearing a religious badge containing the Kallma Tayyaba. (5)

This commentary describes Ordinance XX and shows why it violates the international human rights law provisions protecting religious freedoms. It then analyzes the Ahmadi case and shows why that decision also goes against these provisions. It concludes with an appeal to the government of Pakistan to comply with its obligation to ensure that all internationally recognized provisions for protecting religious freedom are fully implemented in Pakistan, not only for the Ahmadi Muslims but for all people of Pakistan and the world.

ORDINANCE XX VIOLATES FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

The issue in the Ahmadi Case is whether Ordinance XX violates the Pakistan Constitution and the rights to religious freedom of Ahmadi Muslims. Before discussing the Ahmadi Case it is necessary to understand Ordinance XX and then to relate it to international human rights law standards on religious freedoms.

Ordinance XX adds two new sections to the Pakistan Penal Code and provides prison terms of up to three years and unlimited fines for any member of the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam (referred to in the Ordinance as the “Quadiani group” or “Lahori group”) who uses certain words of address, who calls his or her place of worship a masjid (mosque), or who recites the azan (Muslim form of prayers) “as used by Muslims.” (6) It also provides prison terms of up to three years and unlimited fines for any Ahmadi who “poses himself as a Muslim” or who refers to his or her faith as Islam, or who preaches or propagates his or her faith or by “visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims.” (7) As is obvious, this Ordinance makes a rather drastic restriction of the rights of Ahmadi Muslims to profess and practice their religion.

Freedom of religion is one of the fundamental rights protected in international law. The United Nations Charter especially emphasizes non discrimination on the basis of religion in its main articles addressing human rights. (8) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the Universal Declaration) (9) provides the essentials of freedom of religion:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. (10)
Protection of freedom on religion is reinforced in Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the International Covenant) (ll) and by the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (the Religious Declaration) (12) promulgated by the General Assembly to further delineate rights. The Religious Declaration provides the most detail of the international standards, and affirms the right:

(a) To worship or assemble in connection With a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes;
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions;

(c) To make, acquire and use to the extent necessary article and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;

(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;

(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;

(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions;

(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief;

(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with he precepts of one’s religion or belief;

(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion and belief at the national and international levels. (13)

Under international standards, freedom of religion is considered a non-derogable right. (14) International human rights standards also protect religious groups from advocacy of “hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.” (15)

The three international instruments safeguarding religious freedoms all provide for some limitations on the right to manifest a belief (that is to display or publicly show or reveal a religion) when “necessary to protect public safety, order,health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” (16) Allowable limitations include requiring permits for religious processions in public streets (17)or requiring a Social Security number even when against particular religious views. (18) Limitations are not permissible regarding the right to maintain or change a religion or belief. (19) Limitations may not be imposed in order to provide a theological preference limiting rights of one group over another or to satisfy the call of religious groups opposed to the fundamental beliefs of another group. Limitations may not in themselves foster bigotry or be imposed in support of l)iq)try of others more influential with a particular government. (20)

It is patently obvious that Ordinance XX violates these international standards because it penalizes Ahmadi Muslims for believing they are Muslim and for worshipping ar.d assembling as they wish. It attempts to deny Ahmadi Muslims from saying the Azan or even from using the term “azan”. It denies to them even the language and terminology of their religion. Because it provides criminal penalties and fines for protected right it clearly subjects Ahmadi Muslims to persecution because they are Ahmadi.

Not surprisingly, Ordinance XX has already been denounced by the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities as a violation of human rights. The UN Sub-Commission, expressing its “grave concern” at the promulgation of Ordinance XX, found it openly

violates the right to liberty and security of the person; the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; the right to freedom of thought, expression, conscience and religion; the right of religious minorities to profess and practice their own religion and the right to an effective legal remedy. (21)
The UN Sub-Commission alerted the UN Commission on Human Rights that there was a great potential of a mass exodus of Ahmadi Muslims from Pakistan due to their persecution. The SubCommission also asked that the Government of Pakistan “repeal Ordinance XX and restore the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons in its jurisdiction.” (22)

In adopting its resolution 1985/21, the UN Sub-Commission had clearly rejected justifications presented by the government of Pakistan for the limitations imposed on Ahmadi Muslims by Ordinance XX. While claiming that Ahmadi beliefs led to violence, the government asserted that it acted “to restrain certain Ahmadi practices which offend orthodox Muslims.” (23) The real gravamen of the Pakistani position at that time was that Ahmadis offend because Ahmadis consider themselves Muslim, which of course, they have the right to do under international standards. In defending Ordinance XX, then President General Zia-ul-Haq told this author “Ahmadis offend me because they consider themselves Muslim… Ordinance XX may violate human rights but I don’t care.” (24)

Laws and acts that discriminate, rather than preventing violence, are themselves instigators of religious-based violence. As stated Mrs. Elizabeth Odio Benito in her Study of the Current Dimensions of the Problems of Intolerance and of Discrimination on Grounds of Religion and Belief, (25) intolerance of the religious beliefs of others leads to an “unfavorable attitude of mind towards persons or groups” but also can lead to the “stirring up of hatred against or persecution of individuals or groups of a different religion. ” (26) She goes on to point out that intolerance may be “institutionalized and based on legislation” (27) and identifies Pakistan’s treatment of Ahmadi Muslims that motivated Sub-Commission resolution 1985/21 as one example of government action arising from prejudice and bigotry that had given rise to outright hatred, persecution and repression. (28)

THE Ahmadi Case

Pakistan’s Constitution protects the right of individuals to profess, practice and propagate [ ] religion” (29) and the right of religious groups “to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions.” (30) Article 20 of the Pakistan Constitution has been singled out by the United Nations Rapporteur as being one of the few that “conforms to the standard proclaimed in article 6 (b) of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and the Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief.” (31) The two earliest civil actions in the Ahmadi Case had been brought in 1984 to challenge Ordinance XX in light of these provisions of the Constitution. The actions were dismissed in the lower courts on the grounds that the Constitution was then suspended. (32) In the consolidated Ahmadi many hoped that the Supreme Court would restore basic rights of Ahmadi Muslims by finding Ordinance XX unconstitutional in light Article 20 of the Constitution.

The majority in the Ahmadi Case, however, issued a ruling that is far outside acceptable bounds and sullies the judicial history of Pakistan. This majority chose to ignore the Pakistani Constitution as well as international human rights law standards of freedom of religion and to instead deliberate on whether or not the Ahmadi Muslims are theologically Muslims from the point of view of the religious beliefs held by this majority. (33) According to the majority analysis, Ahmadis are only entitled to their religious belief that they are Muslim and the practices they carry out in their belief that they are Muslim if theologically correct. If not theologically correct, then the Ahmadis’ right to believe themselves Muslim may be curtailed and their right to live as a Muslim may be prohibited. The bulk of the majority case (Ahmadi Case, Majority op. pp. 19 – 33) was devoted to showing that the Ahmadi Muslims are not theologically correct.

The majority determines that Ordinance XX has as its purpose
“to prevent unscrupulous and fraudulent non-Muslim from using the effective and attractive features of Islam in order to attract other non Muslims not to Islam but to their own heretic fold.” (34)

The majority then provides a series of decisions from other jurisdictions on the issue of acceptable limitations to religious practices. (35) These decisions essentially duplicate the concept of limitations set out above from the international human rights instruments relevant to religious freedoms or support the right of the high court to rule on the constitutionality of national laws relating to religion. Not one of these decisions from other jurisdictions addresses the types of limitations and criminalization of religious beliefs and practices found in Ordinance XX and can not be properly cited to defend such limitations. Indeed, if these cases were correctly read, they would all support a finding that Ordinance XX, by criminalizing prayer, religious terminology and the inherently benign practice at issue in this case (wearing the Kalima Tayyaba), clearly provides for unacceptable limitations. The majority, however, decides, with no further analysis, that the limitation on Ahmadi beliefs and practices contained in Ordinance XX are acceptable and therefore the Ordinance does not violate the Constitution.

More distressing than the impossibly flawed reasoning, however, as the ominous ridicule of Ahmadi beliefs and individual Ahmadis in the opinion. (36) The majority overtly demonstrates intolerance and hatred based on religious beliefs and actually incites direct violence against Ahmadis by stating

“Can then anyone blame a Muslim if he loses control on hearing, reading or seeing such blasphemous material as has been produced by Mirza Sahib?” (37)
and then comparing the situation to that of Salman Rushdi, under a death order by certain Islamic leaders because they consider his writing blasphemous. (38) The majority also further denigrates Ahmadi Muslims by referring to them as “hyper-sensitive.” (39)

In defending the limitations to religious speech of Ordinance XX, the majority also seriously confuses the issue of freedom of Religious expression and national regulation of commercial speech by commercial enterprises. (Majority op. pp. 3 – 6). The Court assumes that religious speech is the same as commercial speech and cites a number of provisions in foreign jurisdictions allowing restrictions on commercial speech and protection of certain words and phrases through application of copyright laws. The allowed restrictions on commercial speech are used by the majority to defend restriction on religious terminology used by Ahmadi Muslims.

No jurisdiction cited in the Ahmadi Case treats restriction on commercial speech in the same way as restrictions relating to freedom of religion. None of these jurisdictions, as indicated above, would allow the restrictions on religious speech allowed by Ordinance XX. Citing these commercial speech limitations appears to be an attempt by the majority to appear learned. The result is the opposite — the justices have regrettably but severely jeopardized their credibility in a way that would be comic if the potential outcome in Pakistan were not so tragic.

Further comment on this decision is pointless — the majority approach is so irreparably flawed that it contradicts the whole notion of religious freedom. As established under international human rights law Ahmadi Muslims have the right to believe and practice as they do regardless of whether another sect of Islam or any other religion agrees with Ahmadi theology. Furthermore, the Pakistan Constitution can clearly be construed to conform with this international mandate. (40) There is simply no excuse for this legal atrocity.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Pakistan is obliged to comply with international human rights standards regardless of the ruling in the Ahmadl case. The fact that its Supreme Court would issue such as opinion as this is an indication of the serious efforts that need to be made in that country to understand and fully implement the international standards. The government should immediately order the release of all Ahmadis held under the provisions of Ordinance XX, and should instruct its officers to do nothing further to implement Ordinance XX. Fines collected from Ahmadis should be returned to them. The government should make very clear that it will not tolerate religious intolerance of any type, in particular actions taken by anyone against the beliefs, persons or property of Ahmadi Muslims or any other religious group. The government should immediately implement its obligation to provide an effective remedy for Ahmadi Muslims and any other religious group that suffers from any form of intolerance or discrimination.

The author is not unaware of the strength of religious feelings in Pakistan and the serious difficulties facing the government as it seeks to preserve the unity of Pakistan. The Ahmadi Muslims are not the only religious group to generate hostility with other Muslims sects or other religions. The Sikh group, the Deobandi group and Shi’a Muslims are but a few of other Muslim groups who have faced vehement hatred from other Muslims. Sikh, Christian, Hindi, Parsi, and Buddhist groups have also felt hatred and discrimination. Pakistan has suffered from ethnic animosity as well. All of these hatreds are fueled by official actions such as those directed against the Ahmadi Muslims, and can nay but serve to further tear apart the social cohesion necessary to maintain national unity.

in early September, 1993, the government of Pakistan set up a National Minorities Commission composed of five members of the government and nine non-governmental members drawn from various religious groups. The Commission has been asked to report on laws and practice that discriminate, and ways to protect religions and their places of worship. This is clearly a step in the right direction for Pakistan. It is hoped that the Commission will be given every facility to carry out its mandate, that the Commission’s recommendations will reflect international human rights standards, and that the government of Pakistan will implement these recommendations. In this light, the government of Pakistan should consider inviting the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance to visit Pakistan and to meet with this new Commission.

FOOTNOTES

(1) C.A. 149/89, slip op. (Supreme Court, Jul. 3, 1993)(hereinafter Ahmadi Case).

(2) Criminal Appeals Nos. 31K – 35K of 1988 (Judgement of High Court Baluchistan, Dec. 22, 1987); Civil Appeals Nos. 149/89 and 150/89 (Judgement of High Court Lahore, Sept. 25, 1984); and Civil Appeal No. 412 (Judgement of High Court Lahore, Sept. 17, 1991 ) .

(3) Members of the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam consider themselves to be a sect of Islam and from their point of view maintain basic Muslim practices and beliefs. Religious scholars of some other sects of Islam do not consider Ahmadi Muslims true Muslims, a fact irrelevant to the Ahmadi Muslims own beliefs.

(4) Ordinance XX was issued by dictator General Zia-ul-Haq on April 26, 1984 during the period (from July 7, 1977 – December 31, 1985) in which he had suspended the Constitution and governed under martial law powers. At the time of the termination of martial law powers, General Zia continued the effect of his martial law ordinances by promulgation of the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act of 1985, still in force in Pakistan. General Zia-ul Haq did not himself consider Ahmadi Muslims to be Muslims and indicated great personal hostility towards them, including to this author in an interview at Army House, Rawalpindi, on May 5, 1986.

(5) The Kalima Tayyaba, a pronouncement of faith in Allah and Muhammad as His messenger, is cardinal to Muslims.

(6) Pakistan Penal Code Section 298B.

(7) Pakistan Penal Code, Section 298C. Ordinance XX also amends the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to penalty schedules and the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance.

(8) U.N. Charter, Arts. 1 and 55.

(9) G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/811 at 1 (1948)(hereinafter Universal Declaration). The Pakistani jurist Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, himself an Ahmadi, was one of the participants in the drafting of the Universal Declaration. He later became a justice of the International Court of Justice, serving as its President or Vice President from 1958-61 and 1970-73.

(10) Universal Declaration, Art. 18.

(11) 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 18. Freedom of religion is also protected by article 19 which provides for freedom of opinion and expression and for the right to receive and impart information through any media.

(12) G.A. Res. 36/55 of November 25, 1981.

(13) Religious Declaration, article 6.

(14) International Covenant, article 4. “The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute.” Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).

(15) International Covenant, Article 20.

(16) Religious Declaration, Article 1. This provision is identical to Article 18 of the Covenant which specifically protects religious freedom. It echoes Article 29 of the Universal Declaration containing a general “limitation” provision.

(17)See, e.g. Cox w. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), cited in The Ahmadi Case, majority op. at 17.

(18)see, e.g. Bowen v.Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)

(19)See, e.g. Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices, U.N. Sales No. E.60.XIV.2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev. 1 (1960) at p. 16; Regina v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] S.C.R. 295: “The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses.”

(20) Rather than limit religious groups when there is hostility or bigotry based on religious intolerance, governments are obligated to defend the group suffering intolerance and to provide them with effective remedies for redress. See, e.3. U. N. Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/25, op. paras 3, 5, and 6, U.N. Doc. E/1993/23 at p. 111, 112 (points out the obligation of states to provide “effective remedies where there is intolerance or discrimination based on religion or belief” and to “combat hatred, intolerance and violence” motivated by religious intolerance).

(21) U.N. E.S.C. Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities res. 1985/21~ op. para. 1, U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/1986/5 at 102.

(22) Id op. para. 3

(23) Statement of Pakistan (Right of Reply), 42 U.N. E.S.C. Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doe, E/CN.4/1986/SP.31 at p 3. The government of Pakistan had also circulated Memorandum on the Ahmadiyya Question which states” It was found necessary to specify and identify, in Ordinance XX, those practices of the Ahmadis which portray them as Muslims and, when publicly manifested, cause Grave affront to the religious sentiments of Muslims (to say nothing of the confusion they create in their minds).”

(24) Author’s interview with General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haqt in Rawalpindi at Army House (May 5, 1986).

(25) U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26.

(26) U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/26 at p. 3.

(27) Id .

(28)Id. at 9, 11-12

(29) Const. Pakistan, Art. 20 (a).

(30)Id., Art. 20 (b). Article 20 contains a limitation provision similar to provisions in the international instruments.

(31) E. Odio Benito, op. cit., U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/Sub.2/1987/26 at p. 31.

(32) Ahmadi Case, slip op. at 6.

(33) Justice Shafiur Rahman would have set aside the convictions and sentences of the criminal defendants and would have partly allowed the civil appeals. Justice Shafiur Rahman found much of Ordinance XX ultra vires to the Constitution. Rahman, J., sep. op. at p. 21-23.

(34) Majority op. at p. 8, adopting the analysis of the Federal Shariat Court in Mujisur Rehman v. Federal Government of Pakistan, P.L.D. 1985 F.S.C. 8.

(35) Majority op., pp. 10 – 18.

(36) The majority opinion, pages 19 – 33 is essentially a diatribe against Ahmadi beliefs and has no place in a judicial ruling. Note that the UN Sub Commission resolution on the Ahmadi situation in Pakistan calls attention to the “independence of the judiciary . . . as [a] general principles of law of civilized nations [and] an essential element of the effective legal remedy required of all nations.” UN Sub-Commission res. 1985/21, preamb. para. 3.

(37) Majority op. at 33.

(38)Id.

(39) Majority op. at. 35.

(40) The author points out that a prior amendment to the Pakistan Constitution declared the Ahmadis to be non-Muslim. While the author is not in favor of such declarations by governments in any circumstance, that declaration by itself does not set up a regime in which the Ahmadi Muslims are restricted in their own beliefs and practices, and hence is not a direct violation of their rights. It does, however, foster animosity and hatred of Ahmadi Muslims and for those grounds is hostile to international human rights standards which require States to foster harmony and brotherhood among peoples of all or no religion.

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MP Bhandara passes away

Updated at

Monday, June 16, 2008 ISLAMABAD: Former MNA MP Bhandara passed away here on Sunday at the age of 71 due to complications as a result of a serious automobile accident in China several weeks ago. He leaves behind a legacy of enlightened political activism. He was the architect and owner of one of the most successful and durable business conglomerates in Pakistan. He belonged to the Parsi comunity. Bhandara was a minority representative and a former member of the National Assembly. The National Assembly on Sunday paid tribute to MP Bhandara, a senior parliamentarian known for his indepth knowledge of parliamentary practices and rules. Minister for Labour and Manpower Khursheed Shah announced Bhandara’s sad demise on the floor of the House and Speaker Fehmida Mirza observed a one-minute silence as a mark of respect for the former MNA. The speaker said: “He was a seasoned parliamentarian whose role was very significant in the last assembly.” Akram Masih Gill recalled that during the last assembly, he and Bhandara used to sit on the treasury benches. “He always talked of the rule of law and worked wholeheartedly to maintain the sanctity of the House,” Masih Gill said. Shakeela Khanum termed the news of Bhandara’s demise a tragic one and said she had known his family for a long time. She recalled her association with Bhandara’s sister Bapsi Sidhwa and said they were a learned family. Shahzada Mohiuddin said he had known Bhandara since 1985. He was an honest and responsible person, Mohiuddin added. He said Bhandara used to visit the Kalash valley and spent millions of rupees for the development and welfare of the Kalash community. “On behalf of the Kalash community, I can say that they will be very saddened at his demise,” he said. Haider Abbas Rizvi on behalf of MQM chief Altaf Hussain condoled with the family of Bhandara and said he had helped him in understanding some very difficult clauses of various bills. “I had never seen him raise a point of order which was against the rules and regulations,” he said. Riaz Hussain Pirzada recalled the last speech of Bhandara in the National Assembly in which he urged the US to hold talks with the Taliban to bring peace in Afghanistan. Chairman Senate, Mohammedmian Soomro and Deputy Chairman Senate, Jan Muhammad Khan Jamali have expressed their deep grief and sorrow over the death of the veteran minority legislator. They paid rich tributes to the services rendered by the late parliamentarian especially in his capacity as a member of the Standing Committee on Culture, Minorities and Parliamentary Affairs, said a press release.

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